Court	Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
Case No.	Crl.OP(MD) No. 12300 of 2025
Judge	Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Pugalendhi
Petitioner	Saravanan C.
Respondents	State of Tamil Nadu; Pothumponnu
Charges	Sections 69 and 351(2), Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023
Provision Invoked	Section 528 BNSS (quashing of proceedings)
Decision	Proceedings quashed in entirety
Date of Judgment	12 November 2025

The Court’s Decision

The Madras High Court quashed the criminal prosecution initiated against the petitioner under Sections 69 and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), finding that the allegations, even taken at face value, amounted to nothing more than the unravelling of a long-standing consensual relationship between two educated adults. Justice B. Pugalendhi held that criminal law provisions relating to sexual offences premised on an alleged false promise to marriage must be invoked with extreme caution — and only where consent was vitiated by deceit that existed at the very inception of the relationship.

In its analysis of Section 69 BNS — the provision that criminalises sexual intercourse obtained through deceitful means or by making a promise to marry without any intention of fulfilling it — the Court drew extensively on authoritative precedents from the Supreme Court. These included Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra, and Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal. The collective thrust of these decisions is clear: not every breach of a marriage promise or failed relationship can be elevated to a criminal offence under 69 BNS unless there is cogent material demonstrating fraudulent intent from the very beginning.

The Court agreed with this well-established judicial trajectory, concluding that the continuation of an intimate relationship over several years without protest effectively negated any claim that the petitioner deceived the complainant from the outset. On the charge of criminal intimidation under Section 351(2) BNS, the Court applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi) to hold that such an offence cannot be made out from disputes arising within the context of an admittedly consensual relationship.

In a notable observation, the Court emphasised that criminal law deals with legality, not morality. The judgment concluded that continuation of the prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of law. The proceedings before the Judicial Magistrate No. III, Dindigul, were quashed in their entirety, and the connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.

Factual Background

The case originated from a relationship between the petitioner and the complainant that began during their college years. The complainant was then studying at the Government Law College, Madurai, and the petitioner was enrolled at Madurai Kamaraj University. They became acquainted, and their interaction gradually developed into an intimate relationship.

According to the prosecution, on 11 March 2020, the petitioner invited the complainant to a motor shed near his village, where he allegedly had sexual intercourse with her against her will under the pretext that he intended to marry her. The prosecution further alleged that the parties continued to engage in physical intimacy on multiple occasions thereafter. When the complainant eventually pressed for marriage, the petitioner refused and, on 25 January 2025, allegedly threatened her, citing caste differences as the reason for his refusal. This led to the lodging of the criminal complaint.

The complainant, who became an enrolled Advocate with the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry in 2018, contended that she consented to the physical relationship solely because of the petitioner’s repeated assurances of marriage. She argued that his ultimate refusal exposed the falsity of his promise from the very beginning, thereby bringing his conduct squarely within the ambit of Section 69 BNS concerning false promise to marriage.

The petitioner disputed these allegations entirely. He maintained that the relationship was voluntary and mutual from inception to end, and that the complaint was motivated purely by personal animosity after the relationship deteriorated. He asserted that no element of deceit, coercion, or mala fide intent existed at any stage.

Issues Before the Court

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Submissions

The petitioner’s counsel, Mr. P. Sathish Kumar, submitted that the relationship between the parties was entirely consensual and mutual, and that the complaint had been lodged out of personal animosity after the relationship deteriorated. He emphasised that there was no deceitful intention at the inception of the relationship and that the petitioner could not be fastened with criminal liability merely because their relationship got strained over time.

Crucially, the petitioner argued that the complainant — being a law graduate and a practising Advocate — was fully aware of the implications of her conduct throughout the multi-year relationship. Under the framework of Section 69 BNS, criminal liability can only attach where the accused made a false promise to marriage with mala fide intent from the very beginning. A subsequent change of mind or inability to marry, the petitioner contended, does not retroactively convert consensual intimacy into a criminal offence. The absence of any contemporaneous protest by the complainant during the five-year relationship further undermined her claim of vitiated consent.

Respondent’s Submissions

The learned Government Advocate, Mr. A.S. Abul Kalaam Azad, appearing for the State, along with Ms. S. Prabha representing the complainant, countered that the petitioner wrongfully induced the complainant into a physical relationship by making a marriage promise he never intended to keep. They argued that this deception vitiated her consent, thereby attracting the ingredients of the offence under 69 BNS.

The respondents contended that the complainant’s decision to continue the relationship over several years was itself a product of the petitioner’s ongoing assurances. His eventual refusal to marry — justified by caste differences — revealed, in their submission, that the promise was hollow from the outset. They further maintained that the petitioner’s conduct on 25 January 2025, when he allegedly threatened the complainant, constituted criminal intimidation under Section 351(2) BNS.

Understanding Section 69 BNS: The Legal Framework

Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 criminalises sexual intercourse obtained through deceitful means or by making a promise to marry a woman without any intention of fulfilling that promise, provided the intercourse does not amount to rape. The offence carries a punishment of imprisonment of up to ten years along with a fine.

The essential ingredient of this offence is that the accused must have engaged in sexual intercourse either through deceitful means or by making a marriage promise that was false from the very inception. This is the critical distinction that separates criminal conduct from a mere civil or moral breach: the law under 69 BNS does not penalise every broken marriage promise but specifically targets situations where the promise was made with no genuine intention of fulfilment, purely to induce consent to physical intimacy.

For a prosecution under Section 69 BNS to succeed, the following elements must be established:

If the relationship was genuinely consensual and the promise, if any, was made with bona fide intention that later could not be fulfilled due to changed circumstances, the offence under Section 69 BNS is not attracted. This distinction between a false promise to marriage (made with mala fide intent from inception) and a breach of promise (where genuine intent existed but circumstances changed) lies at the heart of the Court’s analysis in this case.

Precedent Analysis: Supreme Court Jurisprudence on False Promise to Marriage

The Court relied on a robust chain of Supreme Court decisions that have progressively refined the law on when criminal liability attaches to alleged false promises of marriage under the BNS and its predecessor, the Indian Penal Code.

The Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

Applying the principles established by the Supreme Court, Justice Pugalendhi found that the materials on record disclosed a relationship between the petitioner and the complainant that spanned approximately five years — from 2020 to 2025. The complainant was a law graduate and a practising Advocate, fully aware of the nature and consequences of her actions. Critically, there was no material on record to suggest that the petitioner harboured a fraudulent or mala fide intent at the inception of the relationship.

The Court concluded that the allegations, at their highest, indicated nothing more than a breakdown of a consensual relationship — which, standing alone, cannot attract the penal provisions of Section 69 BNS. The prolonged continuation of intimacy without protest, the education and professional standing of the complainant, and the absence of any evidence of initial deceit collectively pointed away from the essential ingredients of the offence being satisfied.

On the charge under Section 351(2) BNS, the Court held that the reasoning in Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi) applied directly. Criminal intimidation cannot be established from disputes flowing out of a consensual relationship, especially when the alleged threats surfaced only upon the relationship’s breakdown.

The Court’s Observations on Social Realities

In a particularly significant passage, the Court acknowledged the changing contours of personal relationships in contemporary Indian society. Justice Pugalendhi observed that instances of premarital intimacy between consenting adults are not uncommon in present times, and the Court made this observation not to endorse or moralise such conduct, but to recognise social reality as it exists.

The Court noted that the line between emotional attachment and physical relationship is often indistinct, and that when such relationships end in discord, competing narratives inevitably emerge about what transpired in private. Whether a relationship was founded on affection, expectation of marriage, or mere mutual pleasure is ultimately known only to the parties involved. It is neither possible nor appropriate for a Court to conclusively determine such matters.

“The criminal process cannot be used to moralise private conduct or convert personal disappointment into litigation, as Courts deal with legality, not morality. The law intervenes only where consent is vitiated by coercion, deception, or incapacity.”

— Justice B. Pugalendhi, Madras High Court

The Court further observed an increasing trend of complaints where relationships voluntarily entered into are subsequently projected as instances of deception or breach of promise. Such matters, rooted in personal association and mutual choice, do not ordinarily warrant criminal prosecution. The growing tendency to invoke the criminal process in private relationship disputes, the Court cautioned, must be checked — for criminal law cannot become a means for settling personal or emotional disputes.

Conclusion and Order

The Court held that the continuation of the prosecution against the petitioner would amount to an abuse of the process of law. The allegations failed to satisfy the legal thresholds required under both Section 69 BNS (sexual intercourse by deceit or false promise to marriage) and Section 351(2) BNS (criminal intimidation).

Accordingly, the Criminal Original Petition was allowed. The proceedings in PRC No. 75 of 2025 pending before the Judicial Magistrate No. III, Dindigul, were quashed. All connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.

Implications of the Judgment

This judgment from the Madras High Court reinforces the judiciary’s consistent and well-articulated stance that Section 69 BNS must not be transformed into a vehicle for criminalising consensual relationships that later deteriorate. The decision strengthens several important legal principles.